A N 200 Billion Trust Fund Without Governance Reform Is Another Northern Jamboree

By MS Abubakar, PhD, CAS_

Governor Uba Sani of Kaduna State has just spearheaded the launch of the *Northern Nigeria Security Trust Fund*. It will be chaired by *Gen. Martin Luther Agwai (rtd.), with *Alhaji Yayale Ahmad* as a principal figure. The fund is projected to mobilize *about N200 billion* in the long run for security interventions across the 19 Northern states.

On paper it sounds patriotic. In reality, I fear it is another expensive jamboree—heavy on ceremony, light on the root causes.

1. You cannot buy your way out of bad governance

Money was never the missing ingredient. The missing ingredient is accountability.

Insecurity in Northern Nigeria is not primarily a hardware problem. It is a governance problem. The drivers are not mysterious:
Bad governance and exclusion: Political primaries across parties were hijacked. Candidates the people wanted were stepped down so godfathers could impose favorites. When citizens feel the system is rigged at the ballot, they lose faith in the state.

Unemployment and poverty: The North still leads national poverty figures. According to the NBS 2022 Multidimensional Poverty Index, 63% of persons in Nigeria are multidimensionally poor. 72% of those poor people live in the North.

Illiteracy and low HDI: The UNDP Human Development Report consistently ranks several Northern states at the bottom of education and health indices. Over 10.2 million out-of-school children are in Nigeria, with the majority in northern states, according to UBEC/UNICEF data.
Extremism thrives where the state is absent: that absence starts at the local government.

2. The Local Government is Dead. That is where insecurity is born.

Take a walk into any LGA secretariat in the North today. You will find empty classrooms, locked PHCs, non-functional police posts, and abattoirs overrun by weeds.

The 1999 Constitution gave LGAs autonomy for a reason: they are the closest government to the people. In practice in Northern Nigeria, they are appendages of the Governor’s office. Chairmen are installed, not elected. Allocations are diverted.

Result: No government presence. No teachers. No nurses. No jobs. And into that vacuum walk bandits, kidnappers, and recruiters of extremist groups with cash and promises.

You do not need N200 billion to fix this. You need political will to *allow LGAs to work*.

3. Kinetic response without stabilization is a loop

I agree with the military doctrine: Suppress, Stabilize, Consolidate. Yes, we must first suppress the enemy. But what happens after the troops leave?

If we return children to the same dilapidated school, patients to the same clinic without drugs, and youth to the same unemployment line, we are simply preparing the next recruitment pool for criminals.

A Trust Fund focused mainly on vehicles, drones, and allowances for security agencies is a kinetic approach. It treats the symptom. It does not treat the disease.

4. The data is already telling us what to do

If Governors want to reduce insecurity, they already have the roadmap:
1. UNDP Human Development Index: Improve life expectancy, education, and income. States that invest in HDI see direct drops in violence.
2. UN Sustainable Development Goals: SDG 1 – No Poverty, SDG 2 – Zero Hunger, SDG 4 – Quality Education, SDG 8 – Decent Work. These are not slogans. They are security policy.
3. Global Terrorism Index: Countries and regions that improve governance and social inclusion consistently record better scores the following year.

The North does not need another fundraising launch. It needs governors to spend existing FAAC and IGR on the basics: functioning schools, working clinics, rural roads, and jobs.

Imagine if the 19 governors collectively decided that within 24 months, no child in their state will be on the street as an Almajiri without access to Tsangaya + formal education. Imagine if every LGA had a functional primary health center. The security savings alone would dwarf N200 billion.

5. The politics of exclusion.

I am also concerned about how this process was constituted. A project of this magnitude sidelining experienced voices like Lt. Gen. T.Y. Buratai (rtd.) raises questions. Borno chose to field Prof. Babagana Zulum’s representative instead. That is their prerogative. But perception matters.

When a security initiative looks like a club of the politically connected, citizens will not trust it. And without public trust, no Trust Fund will work.

CONCLUSION: Spend political capital, not just money.

Some governors have jokingly told associates they “have so much money they don’t know what to do with it.” If that is true, then the problem is not funding. It is a priority.

Here is what can be done in the short term without waiting for N200 billion:
1. Conduct free and fair LGA elections and grant financial autonomy.
2. Eradicate street begging and Almajiri exploitation* through education and skills programs.
3. Publish LGA allocation and project data monthly for public audit.
4. Align state budgets to HDI and SDGs and measure governors by those metrics.

If we do that, data will vindicate us. The World Terrorism Index will give us a better score next year. If we don’t, the Trust Fund will be remembered like many before it: big launch, big board, big money, zero impact.

The North does not need more jamborees. The North needs working governance.

God bless Northern Nigeria. God bless Nigeria.

Strategic Drift: When Security Policy Becomes Perception Management

By M.S. Abubakar

Researcher, Military Studies & Strategic Affairs

A nation cannot win an insurgency with press releases. In military doctrine, legitimacy precedes communication. You secure the people first, then you explain it to the world. When we reverse that order, we obtain what we have today: tactical activity with strategic failure.

Nigeria is currently facing two converging security crises. Externally, the Sahel has reorganised against us. Internally, killings in Zamfara, Katsina, Benue, and Southern Kaduna continue despite deployments. Both point to one root issue: the quality of strategic advice reaching the presidency.

1. THE SAHEL MISTAKE: COERCION WITHOUT DIPLOMACY

In July 2023, following the removal of President Mohamed Bazoum in the Niger Republic, ECOWAS, under Nigeria’s leadership, threatened military intervention. Legally, the threat was grounded in the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy. Strategically, it was a miscalculation.

Students of regional security know that sanctions and threats must always have a diplomatic track. Without it, you push states into alternative alliances. That is precisely what happened. Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso exited ECOWAS and formed the Alliance of Sahel States, AES.

Today Nigeria shares a 1,500 km border with a bloc that is hostile to ECOWAS, deepening ties with non-Western partners and becoming a corridor for arms and terrorism. We traded regional integration for regional isolation.

The doctrinal lesson is clear. In counter-insurgency and regional stabilisation, the political objective is more important than military action. We achieved the opposite: we preserved principle but lost influence.

2. DOMESTIC INSECURITY: THE HUMAN COST OF WRONG PRIORITIES

While we manage optics abroad, the ground at home is bleeding. Recent reports from SBM Intelligence and other security monitors show a spike in fatalities and mass abductions by Boko Haram, bandits, and other armed groups across the North West and North Central. I don’t need to quote the actual statistics here because they are negative.

The killings in Zamfara, Katsina, Plateau, Benue and Kaduna are not random. They are tied to land, identity, climate pressure, and the proliferation of small arms. Yet the response remains largely kinetic: troops, curfews, and condolences.

Kinetic force can clear territory. It cannot build trust. And without trust, communities will not provide intelligence. Without intelligence, the military is blind.

A human security approach is overdue. This means four things:

1. Direct engagement with community, traditional and faith leaders to de-escalate.

2. Swift justice. Victims on all sides must see the law work.

3. Constitutional state policing and properly regulated community defence.

4. Care for IDPs and families of the fallen. A soldier who knows his family will be cared for fights differently.

3. THE $9M QUESTION: MANDATE, PRIORITIES AND BLOWBACK

This brings us to the most troubling development. According to “The Guardian Newspaper”, the federal government engaged a US firm, DCI Group, for a $9 million contract. The stated purpose was “to communicate the federal government’s efforts to protect Christians” in the United States and to help secure high-level meetings in Washington.

From a national security perspective, three issues arise.

First, mandate and coordination. Defence diplomacy is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The office of the National Security Adviser is a coordinating and advisory one. When the NSA’s office leads a $9m PR contract instead of driving intelligence fusion and inter-agency planning, it creates confusion in the chain of command. Our adversaries exploit that confusion.

Second, prioritisation. Nine million dollars can fund 1,000 community early warning networks. It can equip mobile courts for speedy prosecution of criminality. It can support trauma counselling for communities in the Middle Belt. Spending it abroad to explain what is not working at home sends the wrong signal to both citizens and enemies. Perception does not stop bullets. Governance does.

Third, strategic blowback. The Guardian report also notes concerns raised in the US about the background of the lobby firm. In international relations, partner vetting matters. A misstep in Washington can damage the very military-to-military and intelligence relationships our troops need for equipment, training, and information sharing. We risked access for optics.

4. BACK TO FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE ROLE OF THE NSA

The role of the National Security Adviser is defined by law, not by politics. It is to provide the president objective, timely, and integrated advice. It is not to run PR. It is not to manage 2031.

Three things must happen now:

1. Return to Human Security. The metric of success should not be based on US meetings. It must be. Are fewer Nigerians dying this month than last month? Are farmers returning to their farms?

2. Restore Civil-Military Unity. The minister of defence, the NSA, service chiefs, and intelligence heads must speak with one voice. Rivalry in the security sector is a gift to insurgents.

3. Advice without fear or favour. History is a patient judge. Nigeria has experienced a succession of administrations. As we witnessed in 1998 and 2009, no office is permanent. Power is fiduciary. “To whom much is given, much is required.”

CONCLUSION: FEWER GRAVES, NOT BETTER PRESS

Mr President does not need advisers who manage his image. He needs advisers who will tell him the truth.

Lobbying will not help you escape Bokkos. You cannot contract your way out of Guma. You cannot explain away abductions in Lassa.

The Sahel taught us that threats without diplomacy isolate you. The Middle Belt is teaching us that communication without governance betrays you.

What Nigeria needs is less money for foreign optics and more investment in Nigerian lives. We need a security architecture that is proactive, unified, and focused on the human being.

The NSA should consider making an immediate pivot. Advise wisely. Coordinate fully. Prioritise human security.

The time for course correction is now. History is watching, and so are 230 million Nigerians. The way I see it, the world doesn’t take us seriously anymore. This insecurity is thriving because like General TY Danjuma once said, some of us are covering and even colluding with the enemies of the state. We are in dangerous times, but we seem not to know it. What a pity!

Inuwa Yahaya, NSGF and the Renewed Northern Resolve

By Ismaila Uba Misilli

The resolutions from the recent meeting of the Northern States Governors’ Forum (NSGF) in Abuja, chaired by Gombe State Governor Muhammadu Inuwa Yahaya, CON may well mark a turning point in the North’s response to its long-running security and development crises.

For a region that has spent the better part of the last decade battling insurgency, banditry, kidnapping, communal violence and economic disruption, the significance of this renewed collective resolve cannot be overstated.

What stands out in the Forum’s latest deliberations is not just the acknowledgement that the security situation has shown measurable improvement since its last meeting in December 2025 but the insistence that such gains must not breed complacency.

This is perhaps the most important lesson Northern leaders appear to have embraced: insecurity is not defeated by episodic military gains alone but by sustained political coordination, strategic financing and institutional continuity.

The decision to operationalise the Northern States Security Trust Fund, with each state contributing N1 billion monthly, is arguably one of the boldest regional security financing initiatives in recent Nigerian history.

This fund could be the game changer, as it will provide the North with a dependable mechanism for supporting intelligence gathering, rapid response logistics, surveillance systems and other complementary interventions that federal structures alone have struggled to deliver consistently.

The fact that some states have already begun making contributions sends a strong message that governors appreciate the urgency of moving from declarations to measurable commitments.

Security threats in the North do not respect state boundaries. A weak link in one state often becomes a direct threat to neighbouring territories. This situation is why the success of the Trust Fund depends on the size of the commitment and the discipline of compliance, as well as the integrity of its governance framework and the transparency of its accountability mechanisms.

Beyond security financing, the Forum’s parallel decision to invest in a permanent secretariat deserves equal attention.

The decision may seem administrative on the surface, but it is, in reality, a strategic institutional reform. Regional forums in Nigeria often lose momentum because decisions are tied too closely to individuals and political tenures. By building a functional secretariat backed by structured contributions, the NSGF, under Inuwa Yahaya, is laying the foundations for policy memory, continuity, and stronger coordination beyond electoral cycles.
This institutional strengthening is critical because the North’s challenges are too complex for ad hoc politics.

Perhaps nowhere is the need clearer than in the Forum’s sustained advocacy for state police, an issue that has moved from abstract constitutional debate to practical necessity.

The North’s security realities have exposed the limitations of an overly centralised policing architecture. Local threats require local intelligence. Communities under siege need security structures that understand their terrain, social dynamics and conflict triggers.

The NSGF’s continued push for state policing therefore reflects a realism grounded in the daily experiences of affected communities.

In this regard, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu deserves credit for engaging the National Assembly on the constitutional reforms required to make the proposal a reality. The president’s willingness to support the legal framework for state policing is quite in line with a growing national consensus that the old model is increasingly inadequate.

Still, the governors are right to look beyond the immediate manifestations of violence. One of the strongest points in the NSGF chairman’s remarks was his recognition that insecurity in the North is inseparable from poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and underdevelopment. This is a truth often repeated but rarely acted upon with the seriousness it deserves.

A region with millions of out-of-school children, high youth unemployment rates, and weak economic opportunities cannot sustainably secure itself through force alone. We must address the social conditions that create vulnerability to recruitment by criminal and extremist groups with the same urgency as military operations.

This is why investments in education, human capital development and youth enterprise are not secondary to security; they are central to it.

The same logic applies to the recurring farmer-herder conflicts that tend to intensify with the onset of the rainy season. By backing the federal government’s livestock transformation agenda, northern governors appear to be embracing a more structural solution to one of the region’s most persistent conflict drivers.

If modern livestock systems, ranching methods, and better agricultural practices are taken seriously, the North could turn a major cause of seasonal violence into a way to improve rural wealth.

What the latest NSGF meeting ultimately reveals is a growing recognition among Northern leaders that the region’s problems require a combination of security reform, institutional resilience, economic inclusion and political unity.

For too long, responses to Northern Nigeria’s crises have been fragmented, reactive and overly dependent on federal rescue. But the new posture, championed by Governor Inuwa Yahaya, suggests a shift towards shared ownership and regional responsibility.