Strategic Drift: When Security Policy Becomes Perception Management

Strategic Drift: When Security Policy Becomes Perception Management

By M.S. Abubakar

Researcher, Military Studies & Strategic Affairs

A nation cannot win an insurgency with press releases. In military doctrine, legitimacy precedes communication. You secure the people first, then you explain it to the world. When we reverse that order, we obtain what we have today: tactical activity with strategic failure.

Nigeria is currently facing two converging security crises. Externally, the Sahel has reorganised against us. Internally, killings in Zamfara, Katsina, Benue, and Southern Kaduna continue despite deployments. Both point to one root issue: the quality of strategic advice reaching the presidency.

1. THE SAHEL MISTAKE: COERCION WITHOUT DIPLOMACY

In July 2023, following the removal of President Mohamed Bazoum in the Niger Republic, ECOWAS, under Nigeria’s leadership, threatened military intervention. Legally, the threat was grounded in the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy. Strategically, it was a miscalculation.

Students of regional security know that sanctions and threats must always have a diplomatic track. Without it, you push states into alternative alliances. That is precisely what happened. Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso exited ECOWAS and formed the Alliance of Sahel States, AES.

Today Nigeria shares a 1,500 km border with a bloc that is hostile to ECOWAS, deepening ties with non-Western partners and becoming a corridor for arms and terrorism. We traded regional integration for regional isolation.

The doctrinal lesson is clear. In counter-insurgency and regional stabilisation, the political objective is more important than military action. We achieved the opposite: we preserved principle but lost influence.

2. DOMESTIC INSECURITY: THE HUMAN COST OF WRONG PRIORITIES

While we manage optics abroad, the ground at home is bleeding. Recent reports from SBM Intelligence and other security monitors show a spike in fatalities and mass abductions by Boko Haram, bandits, and other armed groups across the North West and North Central. I don’t need to quote the actual statistics here because they are negative.

The killings in Zamfara, Katsina, Plateau, Benue and Kaduna are not random. They are tied to land, identity, climate pressure, and the proliferation of small arms. Yet the response remains largely kinetic: troops, curfews, and condolences.

Kinetic force can clear territory. It cannot build trust. And without trust, communities will not provide intelligence. Without intelligence, the military is blind.

A human security approach is overdue. This means four things:

1. Direct engagement with community, traditional and faith leaders to de-escalate.

2. Swift justice. Victims on all sides must see the law work.

3. Constitutional state policing and properly regulated community defence.

4. Care for IDPs and families of the fallen. A soldier who knows his family will be cared for fights differently.

3. THE $9M QUESTION: MANDATE, PRIORITIES AND BLOWBACK

This brings us to the most troubling development. According to “The Guardian Newspaper”, the federal government engaged a US firm, DCI Group, for a $9 million contract. The stated purpose was “to communicate the federal government’s efforts to protect Christians” in the United States and to help secure high-level meetings in Washington.

From a national security perspective, three issues arise.

First, mandate and coordination. Defence diplomacy is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The office of the National Security Adviser is a coordinating and advisory one. When the NSA’s office leads a $9m PR contract instead of driving intelligence fusion and inter-agency planning, it creates confusion in the chain of command. Our adversaries exploit that confusion.

Second, prioritisation. Nine million dollars can fund 1,000 community early warning networks. It can equip mobile courts for speedy prosecution of criminality. It can support trauma counselling for communities in the Middle Belt. Spending it abroad to explain what is not working at home sends the wrong signal to both citizens and enemies. Perception does not stop bullets. Governance does.

Third, strategic blowback. The Guardian report also notes concerns raised in the US about the background of the lobby firm. In international relations, partner vetting matters. A misstep in Washington can damage the very military-to-military and intelligence relationships our troops need for equipment, training, and information sharing. We risked access for optics.

4. BACK TO FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE ROLE OF THE NSA

The role of the National Security Adviser is defined by law, not by politics. It is to provide the president objective, timely, and integrated advice. It is not to run PR. It is not to manage 2031.

Three things must happen now:

1. Return to Human Security. The metric of success should not be based on US meetings. It must be. Are fewer Nigerians dying this month than last month? Are farmers returning to their farms?

2. Restore Civil-Military Unity. The minister of defence, the NSA, service chiefs, and intelligence heads must speak with one voice. Rivalry in the security sector is a gift to insurgents.

3. Advice without fear or favour. History is a patient judge. Nigeria has experienced a succession of administrations. As we witnessed in 1998 and 2009, no office is permanent. Power is fiduciary. “To whom much is given, much is required.”

CONCLUSION: FEWER GRAVES, NOT BETTER PRESS

Mr President does not need advisers who manage his image. He needs advisers who will tell him the truth.

Lobbying will not help you escape Bokkos. You cannot contract your way out of Guma. You cannot explain away abductions in Lassa.

The Sahel taught us that threats without diplomacy isolate you. The Middle Belt is teaching us that communication without governance betrays you.

What Nigeria needs is less money for foreign optics and more investment in Nigerian lives. We need a security architecture that is proactive, unified, and focused on the human being.

The NSA should consider making an immediate pivot. Advise wisely. Coordinate fully. Prioritise human security.

The time for course correction is now. History is watching, and so are 230 million Nigerians. The way I see it, the world doesn’t take us seriously anymore. This insecurity is thriving because like General TY Danjuma once said, some of us are covering and even colluding with the enemies of the state. We are in dangerous times, but we seem not to know it. What a pity!